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Abstract. Extending our own and others’ earlier approaches to reason-
ing about termination of probabilistic programs, we propose and prove
a new rule for termination with probability one, also known as “almost-
certain termination”. The rule uses both (non-strict) super martingales
and guarantees of progress, together, and it seems to cover significant
cases that earlier methods do not. In particular, it suffices for termi-
nation of the unbounded symmetric random walk in both one- and two
dimensions: for the first, we give a proof; for the second, we use a theorem
of Foster to argue that a proof exists.
Non-determinism (i.e. demonic choice) is supported; but we do currently
restrict to discrete distributions. 3
1 Introduction
This paper concerns proof of almost-sure termination for probabilistic- and de-
monic programs, ones that move from one state to another by first choosing a
(discrete) distribution demonically from a set of distributions, and then choosing
a new state probabilistically according to that distribution.
Thus we view a program abstractly as a (probabilistic/demonic) transition
system; and we are interested in proving the eventual reachability with probabil-
ity one of a given set of target states (when it is indeed the case). Our strategic
aim is to express our techniques in a form that can be applied to probabilistic
program code in situ, i.e. without the need to construct the programs’ underly-
ing transition systems explicitly (although of course we rely on their existence).
That is, we seek (and find) proof-rules that require no more than local reasoning
in the source code.
In probabilistic programming over a finite state-space S, say, a typical rule is
one that generalises the “variant rule” for standard (non-probabilistic but still
demonic) programs: to each state is assigned a non-negative integer, a variant
bounded above and below, with all states inside some target set S0⊆S assigned
variant 0. One then shows by local reasoning, typically over the source-code of
3 This revises an earlier version [22] by correcting typographical errors and adding an
extra section §9 on historical background.
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a loop body,
that from each state in S∗ = S−S0 there is a non-zero
probability of transiting to a (different) state with strictly
smaller (integer) variant. 4
(1)
If that can be shown, then the rule guarantees that almost all paths in the
transition system eventually lead to S0, where “almost all” means that the paths
not included have probability zero even if taken all together. This probabilistic
rule’s soundness follows from an appeal to a zero-one law [12, 23, 20] which
roughly says:
If there is some ε>0 such that the probability of eventually reaching a
target set of states is everywhere at least ε, then that probability is one.
For infinite-state systems however, although such zero-one laws are still valid,
their ε-conditions are not so easily met by local reasoning. In particular the actual
values of the probabilities attached to the transitions, which in fact are irrelevant
in finite-state transition systems [24, 21], now can make the difference between
almost-certain termination or not. A typical response to this issue is to replace
“non-zero probability” in (1) above with “probability bounded away from zero”.
And that bound can depend intricately on the transitions’ actual probabilities.
That challenge notwithstanding, recent important work [4, 8, 3] has shown
how local reasoning with super-martingales can be applied to solve the termina-
tion problem in a wide class of infinite-state probabilistic programs.
In this paper we combine those successes with some of our own earlier work,
showing in this paper how to use super-martingale reasoning together with a
progress rule to reason about to an important class of transition systems whose
termination seems to be beyond the state-of-the-art, for source-level reasoning
at least. Our key insight is the observation that the combination of a super-
martingale with a local but parametrised progress-condition (in a sense we ex-
plain below) implies the conditions of the zero-one rule.
Our specific contributions are:
1. A new rule that generalises a number of currently known rules (including
our own) for establishing almost-certain termination;
2. A demonstration of a general zero-one proof technique which can be applied
in arbitrary infinite state systems;
3. A thorough analysis of the applicability of the new rule together with a suite
of representative examples; and
4. A limited survey of some pre- computer-science mathematical results that
contribute to this endeavour [16, 9, 1]
4 This is the probabilstic generalisation: in the traditional, non-probabilistic rule the
decrease must be certain. On the other hand, in the traditional case the variant need
not be bounded above. In both cases, it must be bounded below.
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Finally we note that our strategic goal, to translate this and other rules to
ones that can be applied directly to program code, lies in the seminal work of
Kozen [18] for probabilistic semantics, later generalised by us to include demonic
non-determinism and abstract transition systems [25, 20] and even more recently
expanded to include explicit Markov-chain models [10].
2 Informal description of the new rule for termination
2.1 Setting of the new rule, and its purpose
Let S be a state space, possibly infinite, and let S be divided into two disjoint
subsets: one is S0, the states where termination is deemed to have occurred; and
the other is S∗ for the rest. A transition function T is given taking any state s
in S∗ to a set of discrete distributions on all of S; and a transition from some
s in S∗ occurs by first selecting arbitrarily a distribution δ from T (s) and then
choosing probabilistically a next-state s′ according to the probabilities given by
δ. (We discuss this treatment of demonic nondeterminism more thoroughly in
§3 below.)
Our purpose is to give a method for proving that from any s in S∗, re-
peated transitions according to T will reach S0 with probability one eventually.
That property is conventionally called almost-certain termination. For brevity,
from now on we will write AC for “almost certain(ly)” and ACT for “almost-
certain(ly) terminat(ion/ing)”.
2.2 Informal description of the rule
By analogy with existing approaches to proof of termination, we base our tech-
nique on a “variant” function over the states and require it to have certain
properties. Informally described, they are as follows:
Define a variant — Non-negative variant function V from (all of) S into the
non-negative reals is such that V is 0 on all of S0 and V is strictly positive
on S∗. It can be unbounded (above), but not infinite. Note that V need not
be integer-valued.
Impose a super-martingale property — Variant V is a super-martingale
wrt. transitions T , i.e. for any s in S∗ and any distribution δ in T (s), the
expected value of V on δ, i.e. on the states reached in one δ-mediated tran-
sition of T from s, is no more than the value V (s) that V had at s itself.
That is,
For all s in S∗ and δ in T (s) we have EδV ≤ V (s) ,
where we write EδV for the expected value, over discrete distribution δ on
S, of real-valued function V on S.
Note that we do not require a strict decrease of the expected value, and
although V is defined on S0, we do not require that T be defined there.
5
5 Although in general there is a question of definedness of EδV when δ has infinite
support and V is unbounded, that does not arise here.
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Impose a progress property — The transitions T makes progress towards
S0. We require two fixed strictly positive functions p (for “probability”) and
d (for “decrease”), defined for all positive reals, such that in a state s of
S∗ with V (s) equal to some v, any transition δ in T (s) is guaranteed with
probability at least p(v) to decrease the variant by at least d(v). Furthermore
d(v) and and p(v) must be non-increasing as v itself increases. That is,
There are fixed functions p, d on positive reals v, with 0<p(v)≤1 and
0<d(v), such that whenever v=V (s) for some s in S∗, and δ in T (s),
we have
δ{s′|V (s′)≤v−d(v)} ≥ p(v) , where for S′⊆S
we write δS′ for
∑
s′:S′ δs′ ,
and for any 0<v<v′ we have p(v′)≤p(v) and d(v′)≤d(v).
Note that p, d in progress are functions of the variant, defined over all positive
reals, and that even for v not in the V -image of S, still the non-increasing
conditions for p(v), d(v) must be satisfied. (See §4.2’s “What happens when V
is bounded”.)
The rule is proved in §4.1 below.
2.3 Discussion and comparison
Our main innovation in §2.2 is, in our progress condition, to impose the usual
“bounded away from zero” criterion not on S∗ as a whole but instead only on
successively larger subsets of it. That is, we apply it with respect to certain
functions p and d, and the effect of their non-increasing criteria is to ensure
that, as the subsets {s:S∗ | V (s)≤v} of S∗ grow larger, the progress conditions
imposed on them grow weaker but never decrease to “none”. This avoids the
treacherous Zeno-effects that can occur when some progress is always made
but only with ever-smaller steps: the V -decrease condition (“ as far as d with
probability at least p ”) can only be strengthened as V (s) moves towards 0. But
it also avoids the need to set a uniform ε-progress condition for all of S∗.
Although the generality of p, d might seem complicated, in fact in many spe-
cial cases it is very simple. One such is the “distance from 0” variant on the
one-dimensional symmetric random walk, where p, d can be constant functions:
we take S to be the integers, both positive and negative, with S0={0} and
V (s)=|s| and we define p, d to be everywhere 1/2, 1 respectively — with proba-
bility at least 1/2 the variant decreases by at least 1. That is all that’s needed to
establish ACT for the symmetric random walk (§7.1). 6
6 This simplicity shows that the difficulty of finding an ACT rule lies in part in
making sure it does not allow too much: what prevents our rule’s proving that a
biased random walk is ACT? See §7.2.
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2.4 Other approaches
In our own, earlier probabilistic-variant rule [23, Sec. 6],[20, Sec. 2.7], we
effectively made p, d constants, imposed no super-martingale condition but in-
stead bounded V above over S∗, making it not sufficient for the random walk.
Later however we did prove random walk to be ACT using a rule more like
the current one [20, Sec. 3.3].
Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan [4] consider the use of martingales for
the analysis of infinite-state probabilistic programs, and Chakarov has done
more extensive work [3].
In [4] it’s shown that a ranking super-martingale implies ACT, and a key
property of their definition for ranking super-martingale is that there is some
constant ε>0 such that the average decrease of the super-martingale is every-
where (except for the termination states) at least ε. Their program model is
assumed to operate over discrete state spaces, without nondeterminism.
That work is an important step towards applying results from probability
theory to the verification of infinite-state probabilistic programs.
Fioriti and Hermanns [8] also use ranking super-martingales, with results
that provide a significant extension to Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan’s work
[4]. Their program model includes both non-determinism and continuous proba-
bility distributions over transitions. They also show completeness for the class of
programs whose expected time to termination is finite. That excludes the ran-
dom walk however; but they do demonstrate by example that the method can
still apply to some systems which do not have finite termination time.
More recently still, Chatterjee, Novotny´ and Zˇikelic´ [5] study techniques
for proving that programs terminate with some probability (not necessarily one).
Their innovation is to introduce the concept of “repulsing super-martingales”
— these are also super-martingales with values that decrease outside of some
defined set. Repulsing super-martingales can be used to show lower bounds on
termination probabilities, and as certificates to refute almost-sure termination
and finite expected times to termination. (See also §9.2, §9.5.)
There are a number of other works that demonstrate tool support based
on the above and similar techniques. All the authors above [4, 8, 5] have de-
veloped and implemented algorithms to support verification based on super-
martingales. Esparza, Gaiser and Kiefer [7] develop algorithmic support for
ACT of “weakly finite” programs, where a program is weakly finite if the set
of states reachable from any initial state is finite. Kaminski et al. [15] have
studied the analysis of expected termination times of infinite state systems using
probabilistic invariant-style reasoning, with some applications to ACT. In even
earlier work Celiku and McIver [2] explore the mechanisation of upper bounds
on expected termination times, taking probabilistic weakest pre-conditions [20]
for their model of probability and non-determinism.
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3 Our treatment of demonic nondeterminism
Before proving §2.2, we explain our treatment of demonic- and probabilistic
choice together.
Our transition function T is of type S∗→PDS, where P is the powerset con-
structor and D is the discrete-distribution constructor: thus for state s in S∗,
its possible transitions T (s) comprise a set (P) of discrete distributions (D) of
states (S). It simultaneously extends (1) the conventional model S→PS of de-
monic (non-probabilistic) programs and e.g. (2) Kozen’s model S→DS [18] and
later Plotkin and Jones’ model [14] of probabilistic (non-demonic, i.e. determin-
istic) programs. For (1) the embedding PS;PDS is as sets of point distributions,
and for (2) the embedding DS;PDS is as singleton sets of distributions.
The full probabilistic/demonic model has been thoroughly explored in earlier
work [25, 13, 20] and has an associated simple programming language pGCL, for
which it provides a denotational semantics. 7
Using pGCL semantics, we can model our system as a while-loop of the form
while s6∈S0 do “choose s’ according to T (s)”; s:= s’ end ,
where “choose s’ according to T (s)” is simply a pGCL probabilistic/demonic
assignment statement and the semantics of while is given as usual by a least
fixed-point.
An alternative, more recent approach is concerned with expected time to
termination, and while-loops’ semantics are given equivalently as limits of se-
quences of distributions [15]. Either way, the resulting set of final distributions
(non-singleton, if there is nondeterminism) comprises sub-distributions, sum-
ming to no more than one (rather than to one exactly), where the “one deficit”
is the probability of never escaping the loop. Proving ACT then amounts to
showing that all those sub-distributions are in fact full distributions, summing
to one.
Our relying on well established semantics for demonic choice and probability
together is the reason we do not have to construct a scheduler explicitly, as some
approaches do: the scheduler’s actions are “built in” to the set-of-distributions
semantics.
4 Proof of the new rule for almost-certain termination
4.1 Proof of soundness
Theorem 1. Soundness of §2.2 The technique described in §2.2 is sound.
7 This approach is also similar to the work of Segala [26], whose construction based on
I/O automata appeared at about the same time as the workshop version of [13]; and
it has numerous connections with probabilistic/demonic process algebras as labelled
transition systems that alternate between demonic- and probabilistic branching.
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Proof Recall that the state space is S, that the termination subset is S0⊆S
and that S∗ = S−S0 is the rest. The transition function T is of type S∗→PDS
and the variant V is of type S→R≥ with V (S0) = {0}.
Fix some non-negative real number H (for “high”), and consider the subset
SH of S∗ whose variants are no more than H, that is {s:S∗ | V (s)≤H}. By
the non-increasing constraint on p, d we have that for every s in SH any tran-
sition decreases V (s) by at least d(v)≥d(H)=dH say, with probability at least
p(v)≥p(H)=pH . Note that there does not have to be an actual s in S∗ with
V (s)=H for this condition to apply.
Now fix s in SH with therefore V (s)≤H. The probability that V will even-
tually become 0 via transitions from that s is no less than (pH)
dH/dHe, since
taking the probability-at-least-pH option to decrease V by at least dH , on every
transition, suffices if that option is taken at least dH/dHe times in a row.
Since the above paragraph applies for all s in SH , the probability of transi-
tions’ escaping SH eventually is bounded away from zero by (pH)
dH/dHe uni-
formly for all of SH . We can therefore appeal to the zero-one law [12],[23,
Sec. 6],[20, Sec. 2.6], which reads informally
Let process P be defined over a (possibly infinite) state space S, and
suppose that from every state in some subset SH of S the probability of
P ’s eventual escape from SH is at least ε, for some fixed ε>0. Then P ’s
escape from SH is AC : it occurs with probability one.
Note that the zero-one law applies even if SH is infinite.
It is possible however that the escape occurs from SH not by setting V to 0
but rather by setting V to some value greater than H, i.e. occurs “at the other
end”. Because of possible nondeterminism, there might be many distributions
describing the escape from SH ; but because we know escape is AC, they will all
be full distributions, i.e. summing to one. Let δ be any one of them.
Set z=δS0 , i.e. so that the probability of indeed escaping to V=0 is z. Then
the probability of escaping to V >H instead is the complementary 1−z for that
δ, and the expected value of V over δ is at least z×0 + (1−z)×H, since the
actual value of V in the latter case is at least H. But by super-martingale, we
know that the expected value of V when escape occurs from SH , having started
from s, cannot be more than V (s) itself. So we have (1−z)H ≤ V (s), whence
z ≥ 1−V (s)/H.
Now we simply note that the inequality z ≥ 1−V (s)/H holds for any choice
of s,H and, in particular, having fixed our s we can make H arbitrarily large. †
Thus z, the probability of escape to V=0, i.e. to S0, must be 1 for all s.
8 2
8 A subtle issue here is that there might be V=0 states that s can reach via all of S∗
but from which it is blocked because it must terminate when V >H — and our z
above does not take those into account. That is, the inequality wrt. z might apply
only to a subset of the V=0 states that s can reach in the full system S∗. But the
“actual z”, i.e. for the full system, can only be greater still — and so the result holds
regardless.
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4.2 Discussion of the rule and the necessity of its conditions
What happens if V is not a super-martingale? Then ACT could be be
(unsoundly) proved e.g. for a biased random walker biased away from 0, say 1/3
probability of stepping closer to zero and 2/3 of stepping away. Setting its variant
equal to its distance from zero satisfies progress, but not super-martingale.
What happens without progress? Then a stationary walker would be com-
pliant, satisfying super-martingale but not progress. (Remember our super-martingale
does not require strict decrease: a stationary walker would satisfy it.)
Why not allow V to go below 0? In the proof we argued the expected value
of V on exit from SH would be at least z×0 + h×H — but it could be much
lower if an exit in the zero direction could set V to a negative value.
In fact V can be boundedly negative: we would just shift the whole argument
up. But V must be bounded below, otherwise the rule is unsound. Consider the
“captured spline” example (in Fig. 7 of §7.7 below), and replace the 0-variants
for escape by variants −2(n+ 1)2. The ∇ rule (defined in §5) would now apply
with ∇ the constant function −1. For the current p, d rule we could use the large
negative escape-variants to increase the (positive) along-the-spline variants so
that they became unbounded.
What happens when V is bounded? Consider again the 2/3–1/3 biased
random walk. We can synthesise a (super-)martingale by setting V (n)=0 when
n=0 and solving for V (n−1)/3+ 2V (n+1)/3 = V (n) otherwise — it gives the defini-
tion V (n) = 2
n−1/2n−1 with which super-martingale is satisfied by construction.
Then, since V is injective, we can go on to define p(v), d(v) to be the proba-
bility,decrease resp. actually realised by the process whenever its variant is v,
appearing at first sight to satisfy progress trivially: set p to be the constant func-
tion 1/3 and d(v) to be 2−v in this example. Both p, d are non-increasing and
strictly positive over variant values taken by the process.
But progress is not satisfied, because the functions d, p must be defined and
non-increasing over all positive values v and, in particular, not only over variant
values actually taken by the process: that is, they must be defined even for values
v for which there is no s with v=V (s). In this example d(v) decreases to 0 as
v approaches but never reaches 2, and so we cannot set a non-zero and non-
increasing value for d(2) itself. (In §7.7 a similar example is given where instead
it is p(2) that cannot be defined.)
The point in the proof at which this “any v whatsoever” is used is marked
by a marginal (†), where we let H increase without bound. That H does not
have to be V (s) for any “actual” s.
In summary: if V is bounded but the values of “actual” d (or p) are not
bounded away from zero, then for any H greater than all V (s) there can be no
non-zero value for d(H) (or p(H)) and the proof fails. 9
9 See Thm. 2 in §9.1 a for place where unbounded variant seems to be required.
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Why are p, d functions of the variant rather than of the state?
Indeed they could have been defined as functions of the state (simply by com-
posing them with V ). In that case the non-increase conditions would become
If states s, s′ are such that V (s)<V (s′) then p(s′)≤p(s) and d(s′)<d(s).
But we would have to add that V over S∗ must either take only finitely many
values or be unbounded, because we would then no longer be considering the v’s
that correspond to no s. That conflicts with our “purely local reasoning” goal.
Why not simply require V to be unbounded? For a finite state space
V cannot be unbounded; yet for finite state spaces a termination argument is
(usually) easy. As our rule stands, termination for finite state-spaces is handled
as part of the general argument, not as a special case.
Are there alternatives formulations of progress?
Yes: there are several alternatives.
The rule (§2.2) uses progress in its proof (§4.1) only to show bounded-away-
from-zero escape from an arbitrary but bounded V -region (0, H] that we called
SH . That is, starting from any s in SH the probability of reaching eventually an
s′ with either V (s′)=0 or V (s′)>H is bounded away from 0, where the bound
can depend on H. (It is super-martingale that then converts that to AC escape
to S0 alone, that is V (s
′)=0, by letting H increase without bound.) Any other
condition with the same force would do, and a significant programming-oriented
example is given in §5.
Another alternative, more suited to the situation where S, T are laid out
as a transition system or as a Markov process (but not so suitable for systems
expressed as programs), is simply to require that the V -image of S∗ have no
accumulation points. (An example of this kind of condition is found in [16, Item
(i)]and [9, Condition (2) proper divergence].) In that case the size of the set
V (SH), i.e. the “number of V ’s” in any region (0, H], is required to be finite for
any H. If the system is deterministic (or at least only boundedly nondetermin-
istic) 10 then if in every transition V must decrease, by no matter how small
an amount and with no matter how small a probability, escape from (0, H] is
assured because Zeno-effects cannot occur in a finite set: the p(v), d(v) required
in our rule (§2.2) can be synthesised by taking minima over the whole (finite)
set (0, v], i.e. with H=v.
Defining p, d everywhere, rather than only on “actual” v’s, is not a burden if the
v’s are unbounded: define for example pˆ(v′) to be the infimum of p(v) for all actual
v’s with v≤v′. Those extra values pˆ(v′) are never used, since there are no states with
V (s)=v′: just the existence of the extra values is enough.
The only time this trick does not work is precisely the case we are discussing,
where v is bounded but p(v) tends to zero.
10 Both [16, 9] deal only with deterministic systems, i.e. stationary Markov processes.
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5 An equivalent rule based on parametrised strict
super-martingales
Pursuing the theme of equivalent formulations of progress (mentioned just above),
we give here an equivalent rule in which progress is removed altogether, and re-
placed by parametrically strict super-martingale as follows:
There must be a non-increasing strictly positive function ∇ on the pos-
itive reals such that whenever we have V (s)=v for some s, v and some δ
in T (s) then EδV ≤ v−∇(v). 11
(2)
Call this formulation the “∇ rule”, and the original the “p, d” rule. Although
the ∇ rule is simpler to state than the p, d rule, in practice the definition of
∇ can be complicated, often the definitions of p, d are more straightforward.
The similarity of this rule with other strict super-martingale rules is clear: our
condition is weaker (the rule stronger) because we do not impose a uniform ε
across all of S∗.
We show first that the p, d rule implies this ∇ rule.
Lemma 1. (Technical) Let f be a non-negative function
over the non-negative reals, and let y, y′ be non-negative reals; let δ be a discrete
distribution on the non-negative reals. Then
Eδf ≤ y implies δ{x|f(x)<y′} ≥ 1−y/y′ . (3)
That is, if δ guarantees that the expected value of f is no more than some y,
then for any y′ we have that δ is guaranteed with probability at least 1−y/y′ to
set f to a value no more than y′. 12
Proof Let p be the aggregate probability that δ assigns to {x | f(x)≥y′}.
Then, since δ is fixed, the smallest possible value of Eδf is py′, found by making
f itself as small as possible: that occurs when f(x)=0 for all x with f(x)<y′ and
f(x)=y′ for all x with f(x)≥y′. Thus py′ ≤ Eδf ≤ y, whence p ≤ y/y′ and so the
complementary δ{x|f(x)<y′} is 1−p ≥ 1−y/y′. 2
Lemma 2. Guaranteed decrease of variant Let V, S, T etc. be as above. Sup-
pose for some state s in S∗ we have that any T -transition is guaranteed to
decrease the expected value of V by at least some ε>0.
Then any T -transition is guaranteed with probability p to decrease the actual
value of V by at least d, where d:= ε/2 and p:= d/V (s)−d.
Proof Let δ in T (s) be a T -transition from s, and for Lem. 1 set y = V (s)−ε
and y′ = V (s)−ε/2 and f=V . Then δ is guaranteed with probability at least
1− y
y′
= 1− V (s)−ε
V (s)−ε/2 =
ε/2
V (s)−ε/2
11 Note that ∇ must be defined on all the positive reals, not just on the variant values
the process can actually take.
12 If y′≤y then of course this guarantee is vacuous.
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to decrease V by at least V (s)−y′ = ε/2.
So we let d be ε/2 and p be d/V (s)−d. 2
We can now conclude that the ∇ rule implies the p, d rule because if the
ε in Lem. 2 is a non-increasing but never-zero function of V (s), then the p, d-
values synthesised there are also non-increasing never-zero functions of V (s).
Non-increase of d follows from the assumed non-increase of ε, and the non-
increase of p follows from increase of V and non-increase of d.
For the opposite direction, that the ∇ rule implies the p, d rule, we again let
V, S, T etc. be as above. we will replace variant V by V ′ = f◦V where f is a
real-valued function that is
– non-decreasing,
– strictly concave and
– of non-increasing curvature.
That would be equivalently f ′≥0 and f ′′<0 and f ′′′≥0, for which an example is
logarithm.
Now for any state s and δ in T (s), we know that with probability at least
pˆ=p(V (s)) the δ-transition decreases V (s) by at least dˆ=d(V (s)), and from
super-martingale we know that that EδV ≤ V (s). Then because of the concavity
of f , the smallest value of V ′(s)−EδV ′ occurs when δ sends exactly weight pˆ
to (possibly several) s′ with V (s′) = V (s)−d and exactly weight pˆ′ to s′′ with
V (s′′) = V (s)+d′ where pˆ′ is 1−pˆ and pˆdˆ+pˆ′dˆ′ = 0. (The construction of pˆ′, dˆ′
is to make dˆ′ as big as possible while satisfying super-martingale wrt. V .)
Because of f ’s concavity, that smallest value of V ′(s)−EδV ′ will be non-zero;
and because the curvature is decreasing, and p, d are non-increasing functions
of V (s), it will be non-increasing wrt. increasing values of V (s); because f in
non-decreasing, that is equivalently non-increasing wrt. increasing values of V ′.
6 Relation to the rule of Fioriti and Hermanns
Fioriti and Hermanns’ rule [8] does not have our progress condition; instead they
require uniform bounded-away-from-zero decrease of the expected value of the
variant, that is with the same bound for the whole of S∗.
But in §5 we showed that our rule is equivalent to one without progress, i.e.
where super-martingale has been strengthened to the ∇ rule at (2) above.
Fioriti and Hermanns’ rule is then the special case of (2) where ∇ is the
everywhere-ε constant function. Furthermore, since that rule is complete for
systems with finite expected time to termination, the result above means our
proposed rule is also complete for that class. But –as observed in §2.2– our
rule also applies to the unbounded random walk, where the termination time is
infinite.
For further discussions of completeness, see §9.
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7 Examples of termination and non-termination
7.1 Symmetric unbounded random walk (terminates)
We mentioned in §2.2 that with variant the “distance from 0” and p, d the
constant functions 1/2, 1 respectively the ACT of the one-dimensional symmetric
random walker is immediate. We also stressed our concern with source-level
reasoning. Here we illustrate such reasoning for a random-walk program:
s:= 1
while s 6=0 do
s:= s+1 1/2⊕ s-1
end
Reasoning in Kozen’s style [18] (here written in pGCL [25, 20]) would generate
just these two elementary verification conditions for the proof-rule of §2.2: 13
· The expected value of the variant does not increase:
super-martingale s ≥ wp.(s:= s+1 1/2⊕ s-1).s
·With probability at least 1/2 the variant decreases by at least 1:
progress 1/2[s=N ] ≤ wp.(s:= s+1 1/2⊕ s-1).[s≤N−1]
The wp is the probabilistic generalisation of Dijkstra’s weakest precondition
[6, 18, 25, 20].
To allay suspicions that might be raised by the simplicity of the above, we
“uppack” the reasoning used in the proof of Thm. 1, showing in particular how
the zero-one law contributes in this particular example. Without loss of gener-
ality we take the state-space to be the non-negative integers, start at position
s=1 and show that eventually we will reach s=0.
Consider say the segment 1≤s≤100 of the line, and the bounded random walk
within it, beginning (as we said above) at s=1. Since s is decreased by d=1 with
probability p=1/2 at every step, i.e. the progress property, the walker’s chance of
moving to s=0 is at least 1/2100 for every 1≤s≤100. Thus its escape from [1, 100]
is AC, whether that escape is high or low, and the expected value of s when that
happens will be z×0 + (1−z)×100, that is 100(1−z), where z as before is the
probability of escaping to V=0.
But the expected value of s is constant at 1 (the super-martingale property),
no matter how many steps are taken, so that in fact z=99/100. That is, the
probability that escape occurs to s=0 rather than to s=101 is 99/100, establishing
in any case that s=0 is reached from s=1 with at least that probability.
Now replay the argument within the segment 1≤s≤106 instead. The walker’s
behaviour is not affected by the segment within which we reason –it does not
“know” we are looking at [1, 106]– and it moves just as it did in the 100 case. But
because we are thinking about 106 this time, our conclusions are strengthened
to “ escape from s=1 to s=0 with probability 1−1/106 ”.
13 In fact they are both equalities; but in general the inequalities shown are what must
be verified.
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The p, d version of our rule (§2.2) establishes ACT. The variant is the distance from
0 which, everywhere except 0 itself, is a (super) martingale that decreases by at least
d=1 with probability at least p=1/2.
Fig. 1. The unbounded symmetric random walk example
7.2 Constant-bias random walk (non-terminating)
7/43/20 1
State 0
2/3
1/3
2/3
1/3
2/3
1/3 1/3
State 1 State 2 State 3
variant is 2–1/2s-1
Here the walker has constant bias away from 0, and indeed termination is not AC.
Although super-martingale is satisfied and we can define p(v)=1/3, it is impossible to
define a non-increasing function d that gives a lower bound on the amount by which the
variant decreases: the variant at State s is 2−1/2s−1, bounded above by 2 and forcing
the non-increasing but strictly positive d impossibly to satisfy d(2)=0.
Fig. 2. The constant-bias random walk example
In Fig. 2 we have a one-dimensional random walk that does not terminate
AC. If we synthesise a variant V that is an exact martingale, as shown, we satisfy
super-martingale by construction. And its decrease occurs with probability (at
least) 1/3 everywhere. But because the variant is bounded, we cannot define a
d that satisfies progress, so our termination rule does not apply. (And §5 shows
that the ∇-rule does not apply either.) In §§9.2,9.3,9.4 we see that in fact this
walker does not terminate AC.
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State 0
2/3
1/3
3/5
2/5
4/7
3/7 4/9
State s goes up with probability (s+1)/(2s+1). It 
is strictly biased away from 0 everywhere.
State 1 State 2 State 3
0
Here we use the p, d version (§2.2) of the proof rule: the expected value of the variant
after a transition is equal to its actual value before (except at State 0, where our rule
does not require it to be). But still this walker is strictly biased away from 0 at all
positions, with that bias however decreasing towards zero with increasing distance. In
spite of that bias, still its termination is AC.
Fig. 3. The harmonic-bias random walk example
7.3 Harmonic-bias random walk (terminates)
In Fig. 3 we see a biased one-dimensional random walk that still terminates AC.
The key point is that the bias decreases as distance from 0 increases, tending to
“symmetric” in the limit. 14
Here the variant is unbounded. (Compare §7.2 just above, where the vari-
ant is bounded.) Condition super-martingale is satisfied by construction; define
p(v)=1/3 everywhere; and define d(v) to be 1/s where s is the largest such that
Harmonic Number Hs is no more than v. This d is non-increasing in v and
strictly positive.
An alternative proof of termination for this process is provided by the general
techniques of §9.1.
7.4 The “tinsel” process (terminates)
Here we exhibit a process whose infinite stopping time is obvious from its con-
struction. (The random-walk process (§7.1) has the same infinitary property, but
it is not so obvious.)
The root branches with probabilities 1/2, 1/4 · · · , 1/2n, · · · to straight paths of
length 2, 4, · · · , 2n, · · · resp. each of whose contributions to the expected stopping
time is therefore (1/2n)/(1/2n) = 1. Since there are infinitely many children of the
root, the expected stopping-time overall is infinite. See Fig. 4, where the variant
function for ACT is shown.
14 Although we constructed this example ourselves, we later found it in [9, Sec. 3(b)].
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Variants in (0, 1] decrease by at least 1 with probability at least 1. In (1, 2] the (smaller)
lower bound is 1/2; in (2, 3] it’s 1/4; in (3, 4] it’s 1/8. . .
The super-martingale condition is satisfied trivially except at the root node, where the
small calculation 1/21+2/22+3/23+ · · · = 2 ≤ 2 is needed to see that it is satisfied
there too.
The expected stopping time however is
∑
n≥1 2
n/2n =∞. (We call it “tinsel” because
it’s like long ribbons hanging down from a tree.)
Fig. 4. The “tinsel” process (rotated 90◦)
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7.5 The “curtain” process (terminates)
This variation on infinite stopping time begins with transitions that either move
away from the root or “drop down” to ever longer straight runs. Again the
stopping time is infinite but termination is still AC. See Fig. 5, where the variant
function is shown.
1 02
2⅔ 22⅓3 01
2
3
4
01
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
5 3⁶⁄₇ 3⁴⁄₇3⁵⁄₇4 3²⁄₇3³⁄₇1/2
3 2⅓2⅔3¹⁄₇ 12 0
1/2
Variants in (0, 2] decrease by at least 1 with probability at least 1/2. In (2, 3] it’s 1/3; in
(3, 4] it’s 1/7. . . In (s−1, s] it’s at least 1/(2s−2−1).
The super-martingale condition is satisfied trivially everywhere.
The expected stopping time however is again
∑
n≥1 2
n/2n =∞, as for Fig. 4. (We call
it “curtain” because many short runs hang down from a single long run.)
Fig. 5. The “curtain” process (again rotated 90◦)
7.6 The escaping spline (terminates)
Here we illustrate in Fig. 6 how our rule depends on the actual transition prob-
abilities in an intuitive way, that a “spline” whose overall probability of being
followed forever is zero gives a variant with which we can prove its termination.
(Complementarily, if the probability of remaining in the spline is not zero then
our rule does not apply, as we show in §7.7.)
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The states are numbered from s=1 at the left, and V (s) is s itself. The
function p(v) is 1/v+1 and the function d(v) is 1 everywhere: at state s6=0 the
variant is s, and with probability at least 1/s+1 the value of the variant will
decrease by at least 1. In fact, for most s with V (s)6=0 the variant by much more
than 1 — the function d gives only a lower bound for the actual decrease in the
variant.
4 531 2
0
1/2
0
1/3
0
1/4
0
1/5
0
1/6
= 1 / (1/2) = 2 / (2/3) = 3 / (3/4) = 4 / (4/5)
1/2 2/3 3/4 4/5
Each horizontal transition has probability of one minus the (vertcally downwards) es-
cape immediately before it. Each variant 2, 3, 4, · · · turns out to be the previous variant
divided by its incident probability, establishing super-martingale by construction. The
successive probabilities of not having escaped are corresponding prefixes of the infi-
nite product 1/2×2/3×3/4× · · · which tend to zero. Hence the variant increases without
bound, proving that eventual escape is AC.
In general, if the product of the “stay on spline” probabilities tends to zero, the variants
–the reciprocals of those prefix probabilities– increase without bound.
Fig. 6. The “escaping spline” process
7.7 The captured spline (non-terminating)
In the example of Fig. 7, based on [20, Sec. 2.9.1], the process does not escape
with probability one. If we applied the strategy of the escaping spline (Fig. 7),
we would choose variant V (s) = 2s/s+1. It is a (super-)martingale because in
general
V (s−1)×0 + (1−1/(s+1)2)×V (s+1)
= 1/(s+1)2×0 + (1−1/(s+1)2)×(2(s+1)/s+2)
= (s
2+2s/(s+1)2)×(2(s+1)/s+2)
= (s
2+2s/s+2)×(2(s+1)/(s+1)2)
= 2s/s+1
= V (s) .
The decrease function d is trivial: we can set it to the constant 1, since the
potential decrease is always at least 1 with probability 1/(s+1)2.
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But for p(v) we choose (2−v)2/4, i.e. a value that is no more than 1/(s+1)2
when v = 2s/s+1. Whatever that value is, it is clear that it approaches 0 as v
approaches 2, and so we will not be able to select a non-zero value for p(2). As
for §7.2, the results of §§9.2,9.3,9.4 show that this process does not terminate
AC.
8/5? 5/3?3/2?1 4/3?
0
1/22
0
1/32
0
1/42
0
1/52
0
1/62
V ≤ 2
As before, each horizontal transition has probability (this time not shown) of one minus
the escape immediately before it; and each (speculative) variant is the previous variant
divided by its incident probability. The successive probabilities of not having escaped
are now corresponding prefixes of an infinite product (1−1/22)×(1−1/32)×(1−1/42)× · · ·
which, unlike the earlier one of Fig. 6, does not diverge: rather it converges to 1/2. Hence
eventual escape is with probability only 1−1/2 = 1/2.
Making the variants the reciprocals of those cumulative escape probabilities, as in
Fig. 6, results in increasing variants bounded above by 2, which does not satisfy progress
for p(v) when for example v=2.
In general, the strategy of Figs. 6,7 works just when the successive “not yet escaped”
probabilities tend to zero, since that is exactly when the variants, their reciprocals,
increase without bound.
Fig. 7. The “captured spline” process
7.8 The two-dimensional random walk (terminating but not proved)
In Fig. 8 we recall the one-dimensional random walk, but this time using a variant
equal to the logarithm of (one plus) the walker’s distance from the origin and
a ∇-style progress condition. (Compare Fig. 1 in §7.1.) For better comparison
with the two-dimensional version, we have made the walk unbounded in both
directions. It suggests that the two-dimensional walker could be treated with the
variant being based on the logarithm of the walker’s Euclidean distance from the
origin. Again using the ∇ rule, we would have at least to show (something like)
that for all integers x, y we have
log((x+1)2+y2) + log((x−1)2+y2) + log(x2+(y+1)2) + log(x2+(y−1)2)
< 4 log(x2+y2) .
Unfortunately, numerical calculations show that this inequality fails near the
|x|=|y| lines. It seems that the log function bends too much, is “too concave”.
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variant is log(1+|s|)
Here we use the ∇-version (§5) of the proof rule: the expected value of the variant
decreases by at least some fixed positive and non-increasing function of its current
value: the expected decrease here is 1
2
log n
2
n2−1 , a non-increasing function of logn.
Fig. 8. The unbounded symmetric random walk example
We therefore “flatten things out a bit” by trying a double-log log(log(·))
instead, a function still concave but less so, and we have indeed shown by similar
numerical calculations that the corresponding inequality
lgg(x+1)2+y2) + lgg((x−1)2+y2) + lgg(x2+(y+1)2) + lgg(x2+(y−1)2)
< 4 lgg(x2+y2)
(4)
is satisfied for all integers x, y with |x|, |y| ≤ 10, 000. 15
Our conjecture is that (4) holds for all integers x, y and, if it does, it would
establish termination for the two-dimensional symmetric random walk using a
single variant function. 16
See §9.3 for evidence that there is a suitable variant function, even if it turns
out not to be lgg.
8 Compositionality
Following [8], by “compositionality” we mean the synthesis of an ACT -proof
for a system that is composed of smaller systems for each of which we have an
ACT -proof already. For now, we study this only briefly.
Suppose we have a “master” system M and a number of component systems
C1..N . System M has at least N termination states, at which its variant VM is
therefore zero; and each component system has a designated start state sn where
its variant function Vn takes some value vn. The composite system is then made
by “plugging in” each component system’s starting state sn to some termination
state of M .
The systems in Fig. 4 (Tinsel) and Fig. 5 (Curtain) are examples of this,
except that for them the number of component systems is infinite.
In Tinsel, the masterM is a single infinite branch leading with ever-decreasing
probability 1/2n to termination in exactly one step. Its component systems C1..
15 We write lgg for that function. Very close to the origin the it is undefined: but those
cases can be adjusted manually.
16 As hoped, lgg fails in the three-dimensional case.
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are straight line processes each with stopping time 2n−1. The overall stopping
time of the combination is infinite.
In Curtain the master M is a straight-line system with a probability of 1/2 of
termination at each step; its expected stopping time is 2. The component systems
C1.. this time have termination times of 2
n−n. Again the overall stopping time
of the combination is infinite.
Although we did give termination proofs for these two systems, we cannot (i.e
at the moment we do not know how to) synthesise such proofs from the master’s
and the components’ proofs when the number of components is infinite. But here
is what we can do when the number of components is finite:
–$ Define vC to be the maximum over all n of vn, that is a number at least as
great as the starting variant of any of the finitely many subsystems.
– Modify System M by adding vC to its variant function VH .
– Paste the starting node sn of each System Cn into the appropriate termination
state of M . (These are therefore no longer terminating states.)
– Set ∇u for the new, single system to be the pointwise minimum over all Cn
and M of their individual ∇n and ∇M functions.
If the individual systems satisfied the ∇ rule with their separate ∇ functions,
then the composite system will satisfy the rule with the single ∇u function. The
use of finiteness was in two places:
–$ That the vC added to VH was finite. (It is a sup taken over all subsystems.)
– That the ∇u is nowhere zero.
In Tinsel (Fig. 4) and Curtain (Fig. 5), having infinitely many components,
the failure of synthesis occurs at the two points $, because vC is infinite. In
spite of that, as the examples show, we were able to find proofs “by hand” (i.e.
not synthesised). Note however if a proof method were complete only for finite
stopping-time systems, there can be no synthesis in these two cases: although all
the component systems have finite stopping times, but the composite systems
do not.
9 Related historical results on Markov chains
9.1 The work of Blackwell: random walks and radially symmetric
trees
Blackwell [1] gives a general technique for proving termination of a certain sub-
class of Markov processes, those moving both down and up so-called “radially
symmetric trees”. (It also provides an independent proof of termination for our
example §7.3, the harmonic random walk.)
Definition 1. Radially symmetric tree A radially symmetric tree
is finitely branching, having the property that each node at depth d has exactly
cd children, where the root has depth zero and all the c0, c1, · · · are integers at
least 1. 2
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A radially symmetric tree is infinite, and has no leaves.
Definition 2. Random tree-walk A random walk
on a radially symmetric tree starts at any node and chooses uniformly to move
either to its parent or to one of its children, thus with probability 1/cd+1 for a
node at any positive depth d along any of its connecting arcs. At the root, where
there is no parent, the probability is instead 1/c0. (Only the root has no parent.)
Termination occurs when the root is reached. 2
Radially symmetric trees are determined uniquely by their cd’s, and examples
include the following:
(i) Each node has exactly one child, thus a single path starting at the root.
(ii) Each node has exactly two children, thus an infinite binary tree.
(iii) Each node has either one or two children, according to the scheme that cd
is two just when d is a power of two (and thus is one otherwise).
The first example generates the one-sided symmetric random walk in one
dimension, and it terminates with probability one (§7.1). The second example is
(effectively) a collection of 2/3–1/3 asymmetric random walks in one dimension,
down the branches of the tree: its termination is not AC (§4.2). The third, more
complicated example is a binary tree with only infrequent splittings: we show in
Fig. 9 below that it terminates, and quote a completeness result for such trees.
The Blackwell-style proof of (iii)’s termination (a sanity check of our claim)
follows [19], and is ultimately based on Blackwell’s Thm. 2 below. Note that it
is an if-and-only-if:
Theorem 2. Blackwell [1] Let pn for n≥0 be a sequence of probabilities,
with p0=1, and consider the Markov matrix on the non-negative integers defined
Mn,n+1 = pn and Mn,n−1 = qn = 1−pn.
Then any Markov chain with this matrix will eventually reach 0 almost surely
if and only if the equation f(n) = qnf(n−1) + pnf(n+1) has no non-constant
bounded solution. 17 2
A corollary of Thm. 2 gives us a classification of ACT for radially symmetric
trees:
Corollary 1. Lessa [19] Given a radially symmetric tree,
define variant function
V (d) :=
∑
0≤i<d
1
c0× · · ·×ci (5)
where d is a depth of some node in the tree and cd is the number of children
for nodes at that depth. Every node at depth d has variant V (d), and this V is
indeed a super-martingale.
The random walk on this tree, defined as in Def. 2, terminates everywhere if
and only if V (d) is unbounded as d→∞.
Proof 2
17 Note however that our rule does not require V to be unbounded. See §4.2.
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Lessa’s proof of Cor. 1 uses Blackwell’s theorem Thm. 2; but our variant rule
here provides an independent proof for Fig. 9, i.e. without Blackwell’s theorem.
More significantly however, Blackwell’s theorem provides us with a completeness
result for using our variant rule, at least for one-dimensional random walks.
9.2 Blackwell’s completeness result
Blackwell’s work [1] on classifying recurrence in Markov processes suggests how
we might understand the coverage of our new rule. He considers Markov processes
with countable state spaces and stationary (i.e. fixed) transition probabilities,
and shows that such processes have essentially unique structures of recurrent and
transient sets. We now give a summary, using (partly) Blackwell’s terminology
as well as what we have used elsewhere in the paper.
Let C be a subset of the state space, and fix some initial state sˆ. Say that C
is almost closed (wrt. that sˆ) iff the following conditions hold:
1. The probability that C is entered infinitely often, as the process takes tran-
sitions starting from sˆ, is strictly greater than zero and
2. If C is visited indeed visited infinitely often, starting from sˆ, then eventually
it remains within C permanently.
Say further that a set C is atomic iff C does not contain two disjoint almost-
closed subsets.
Finally, call a Markov process simple atomic if it has a single almost-closed
atomic set such that once started from sˆ it eventually with probability one is
trapped in that set. We then have
Theorem 3. Corollary of Blackwell’s Thm. 2 on p656) [1]
A Markov process is simple atomic (as above) just when the only bounded so-
lution of the equation EδV = V (s), that is Blackwell’s Equation (his 6), stating
(in our notation) that V is exact, neither super- nor sub, is constant for all s in
S∗ and δ in T (s). 2
We adapt the above to our current situation as follows. As above, we fix a
starting state sˆ, and we collapse our termination set S0 to a single state s0,
adjusting T accordingly and in addition making T take s0 to itself. We then
assume that the probability of sˆ’s reaching s0 is one. We now note:
(1) Our termination set {s0} is almost-closed and atomic, because
(i) almost closed: Our process reaches s0 with non-zero probability (in fact
we assumed with probability one) and, once at s0, it remains there.
(ii) atomic: Our set {s0} has no non-empty subsets.
(2) We now recall that in fact s0 is reached with probability one, so that the
whole process is simple atomic.
(3) From our Thm. 3 we conclude that the only possible non-trivial variant is
unbounded.
Thus –in summary– we have specialised Blackwell’s result to show that if we have
a non-trivial exact variant that is bounded, then the process does not terminate
AC. This is a result in the style of Chatterjee et al. [5]. (See §2.3.)
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Every note at depth 2n has two children; all others have one child. Transitions from a
node are uniformly distributed over its arcs, thus 1/3 for each of two children and 1/3
up, and otherwise 1/2 up and 1/2 down.
The variant function generated according to the scheme of (5) is
depth d 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
cd 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
V (d) from (5) 0 1/1 1
+ 1/1×2
3/2
+ 1/2×2
7/4
+ 1/4×1
2
+ 1/4×2
17/8
+ 1/8×1
9/4
+ 1/8×1
19/8
+ 1/8×1
simplified 0 1 3/2 7/4 2 17/8 9/4 19/8 5/2
At Depth 4, for example, we have 1/3×7/4 + 2/3×17/8 = 2, thus satisfying super-
martingale at that position. Because the variant at depth 2d is 1 + d/2, i.e. increases
without bound, it is straightforward to construct functions p, d, showing that this pro-
cess terminates.
Fig. 9. Blackwell’s radially symmetric tree
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9.3 The work of Foster: completeness
Foster [9] gives a characterisation of Markov processes for which a technique
like ours is guaranteed to work. A significant example is the two-dimensional
symmetric random walk, supporting our conjecture in §7.8.
Because Foster’s paper seems quite technical, we give here a “translation”
into our own terms. His equations will be referred to as (F1) etc. and his sections
as §F1 etc.
— §F1 We assume that our state space S is countable, enumerated s0,1,··· with
the termination subset S0 being just a single point {s0}, and we extend our
transition function T to all of S, i.e. not just over S∗, by making it take s0 to
itself. The enumeration should correspond roughly to “being further from s0”,
which is made precise in conditions (F6) and (F8).
Foster is concerned with conditions for the existence of a super-martingale
(F1) variant function V from S to the non-negative reals (F3), where V is un-
bounded without accumulation points (F2).
We assume that T is deterministic, and thus specialise it to be of type S to
DS rather than to PDS.
— §F2 The “limit” of taking transitions forever is defined to be T ∗, say, using
the “Cesaro average” 18 that avoids the problem of recurrence when considering
simply T 0, T 1 etc. composed in the Markov style.
But (F4) is not as simple as it looks. It seems to imply that there is no
infinite chain of transient states (such as in the “spline” examples). For if there
were, the mass travelling down the chain would be “lost” in the Cesaro average,
and the sum would not be one. This turns out to be important in the discussion
of (4′) below.
Kendall’s [16] earlier result is
If there is a variant as in §9.3, then T ∗ takes any starting state to a full
distribution on S (i.e. not partial), and there is a finite subset C of S
from which T does not escape.
Foster then explains that the current paper’s purpose is to explore the opposite
implication to Kendall’s [16], i.e. that, under “certain weak additional assump-
tions” on T , if there is such a (finite) subset C as above then there is a V
satisfying the conditions of §9.3.
His additional assumptions include (by implication) that C is reached with
probability one from anywhere in S, his (F4′), because he argues that (F4,F5,F6)
together imply (F4′). That looks at first like the zero-one law. But note that (F6)
does not bound the probability of escape away from zero: it merely says that it is
not zero, and that is not usually enough. Together with (F4) though it suffices,
18 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304414977900321 .
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because (F4) seems to say any transient state (even if there are infinitely many)
must be visited infinitely often (since otherwise the mass moving among the
transient states would be “lost”, as suggested above).
His additional assumptions are then
(F6) From any state in S∗ there is a non-zero probability of reaching S0={s0}
eventually.
(F7) From any state in si in S∗ there is for any j>i a non-zero probability of
reaching any sj eventually. Note that sj is in S∗ also.
(F8) There is a single probability δ<1 for the whole system such that for any N
there is an i such that for all j≥i the state sj cannot reach C within N steps
and with probability at least δ. As he says, it’s a “remoteness” condition,
intuitively mandating that the higher the i the longer it takes si to reach C
with some fixed-beforehand probability δ.
He notes that because of (F4′) the N (which depends on i) is finite: from
si you must get to C eventually with probability at least δ because, in fact,
you get there with probability 1.
— Statement of Theorem F2, and its application to the two-dimensional
symmetric random walk
Recall that S is assumed to be countably infinite. Foster’s Theorem F2 reads
If T satisfies conditions (F4–8), then there is a variant function V on S
that satisfies (F1,F3), i.e. that it is a non-negative super-martingale and
(F2) that it tends to infinity as the state-index tends to infinity.
We note that condition (F2) implies that V is without accumulation points.
The implications of this theorem seem to be e.g. that there must be a variant
in our style for the two-dimensional symmetric random walk, even if it has not
(yet, as far as we know) been given in closed form. We check the conditions
one-by-one:
(F4) This is (apparently) replaced by (F4′).
(F4′) The probability of reaching S0, that is the origin, is one everywhere.
(F5) Once you are at the origin, you do not leave.
(F6) Every state in S∗ can reach S0 with non-zero probability.
(F7) Here we need an enumeration of the states: Foster uses the Manhattan
distance, which makes nested “diamonds” . But since every state in S∗ can
reach every other state, in fact we do not need the enumeration yet. 19
(F8) Any state at Manhattan distance N cannot reach the origin at all until
Step N , and so δ=0 should do for this provided we assign higher indices to
higher-Manhattan-distance states, which is what Foster does in §F3.
19 Foster’s (weaker) condition requires only that each state can reach every higher-
enumerated state.
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Applying Theorem F2 then gives us a super-martingale V such that V (si)
tends to infinity as i tends to infinity, which means that V (s) tends to infinity
as s gets Manhattan-further from the origin, given the indexing that we (i.e.
Foster) have chosen.
To show that our rule applies, we need however to establish a progress con-
dition. (See our earlier remarks about alternative progress conditions, in §4.2.)
First define p(v) to be 1/4 for all v. Then for d, first consider the subset S≤v of
S comprising all those s with V (s)≤v. Because of (F2) the V -image V (S≤v) of
S≤v must be finite; so set d(v) to be the minimum non-zero distance between
any two of them, that is (minV (s′)−V (s) | s, s′∈V (S≤v) ∧ V (s′)>V (s)).
Thus there is guaranteed to be a V satisfying super-martingale and progress
that establishes termination for the two-dimensional symmetric random walk
(§7.8) — even if we don’t know what it is in closed form. Foster’s general proof
is by construction, and we sketch it in App. A.
— Why Theorem F2 does not synthesise a variant for the
three-dimensional symmetric random walk
Foster remarks [9, p. 590] that synthesis cannot succeed for the three-dimensional
random walk (since it is known that it is not ACT ); but he does not say which
of his Theorem F2’s conditions are not satisfied.
Clearly his (F4’) is not satisfied (that the process is ACT ); but that is a
derived condition, a consequence of his original (F4–8), and so it is fair to ask
which of those original conditions fails in three dimensions. Furthermore, his
synthesis procedure is well defined whether the process satisfies ACT or not,
and so we can therefore ask as well what is wrong with the V it synthesises for
the three-dimensional random walk, in our terms.
For the first, it is condition (F4) that must fail. The process satisfies (F5), that
the process is trapped at the origin, and (F6), that the origin is accessible from
every point, and (F7), that every point is accessible from every other (except
the origin). And it seems likely that it satisfies (F8), since by numbering the
states in rings it can be arranged that higher-numbered states have arbitrarily
high first-arrival times at the origin.
Failure of (F4) means that there is some bounded away from zero probabilistic
mass that follows an infinite (not looping) path through the state space: that
is the only way in which the Cesaro limit can “lose mass”, making (in Foster’s
notation) the sum
∑∞
j=0 piij strictly less than one.
For the second, the problem with the synthesised V is that it is bounded,
a failure of condition (F2). Item 4. in §9.4 below shows that in that case our
condition progress cannot be satisfied for that V .
9.4 A modern alternative to Blackwell’s completeness argument
The result of §9.2 can be obtained much more directly using the program se-
mantics of this paper, and an argument in the style of Thm. 1.
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In [20, Lem. 7.3.1] we show (using the terminology here) that if V is a sub-
martingale and is bounded, 20 21 then if escape from S∗ is AC (i.e. the loop
terminates with probability one), the expected value of V on S0 (i.e. on the states
where the loop-guard is false) is at least the actual value of V in the initial state
(of the loop). 22
Now if the initial state is in S∗ then the value of V there is strictly positive;
yet if escape occurs with probability one, the expected value of V on termination
will be 0, since it is confined to S0. That contradiction means that we cannot
have sub-martingale V be bounded and still terminate almost surely.
Here are some remarks on the relation between our argument and Blackwell’s
Thm. 3. Blackwell states that a process is ACT just when its only bounded exact
martingale is constant; our result just above states that an ACT process cannot
have a bounded sub-martingale.
1. What role does the “or is constant” criterion, from Blackwell’s theorem, play
in our argument?
Because we require V to be zero on S0, a constant V for us would be zero
on all of S, meaning that S∗ was empty (since V must be strictly positive
there). So we should add to our result “unless S∗ is empty.”
2. Where do we use in our argument that V is bounded?
How does our argument fail if we don’t?
We use it in our appeal to [20, Lem. 7.3.1], where in fact V is assumed to be
between 0 and 1. If V is simply bounded above (but not by one, necessarily),
then it can easily be brought within range by scaling. If V is unbounded,
however, it cannot be brought within range that way.
An easy counter-example is the symmetric random walk starting at 1 and
aiming to reach 0. The variant “distance from 0” is an exact martingale, and
has value 1 on initialisation. But it is unbounded, and so the conclusion “its
(expected) value on termination is at least its starting value” is false. Indeed
on termination its (actual) value has decreased from 1 to 0.
3. What’s an intuitive (and easy to understand now, in retrospect) reason that
our conclusion is “obvious”, without appealing either to Blackwell or to [20]?
Think of the variant value V , initially concentrated at s, as being gradually
“dissipated” whenever some probabilistic weight escapes to S0. Since V is
zero there, the sub-martingale property requires that V increase, to compen-
sate, on the remaining probabilistic weight still within S∗. But because V
is bounded, that increase cannot go far enough — it eventually must stop.
And that means that some probabilistic weight remains trapped within S∗.
20 Note we say sub-martingale, i.e. that the expected value of V can increase.
21 In that part of [20] we are working an invariant, here our V , that is bounded by
1. That loses no generality, since any bounded V can be divided by its least upper
bound without disturbing its sub-martingale property.
22 See §B for a pre´cis of this loop rule.
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4. Our rule §2.2 proves ACT given super-martingale and progress for some
V . Yet above we show that if V is a sub-martingale and bounded, then ACT
cannot hold. Does that mean that progress cannot hold for any bounded, non-
zero exact martingale?
Yes, it does mean that. If V is bounded, then when the process is at (or
sufficiently near) V ’s upper bound either
(a) The function d must be arbitrarily small (tending to 0), and so it cannot
be non-increasing with respect to a non-zero d-value taken above V ’s
upper bound (for which see Fig. 2), or
(b) The function d is bounded away from zero, in which case the expected
value of V must strictly decrease, thus not realising an exact martingale.
9.5 General comparison with refutation methods
Blackwell’s result Thm. 3 says that a Markov process is atomic and simple if
and only if all exact martingales are constant or unbounded. We showed (in
our terms) that when a program terminates with probability 1, the termination
set implies the program is atomic and simple (as a Markov Process). Then,
using Blackwell’s, result we are able to conclude that all exact martingales are
constant or unbounded. In an independent proof (the one-liner §9.4) we can show
this directly without going through Blackwell, namely that if a program has a
non-constant exact martingale then it can’t terminate with probability 1.
Chatterjee et al. also look at repelling super-martingales to refute almost
termination. Their Theorem 6 uses an ε-repulsing super-martingale with ε>0
to refute almost sure termination. Their Theorem 7 uses an ε repulsing super-
martingale with ε ≥ 0 to refute finite expected time to termination: i.e. to refute
finite expected time to termination only a martingale is required.
Our result in §9.4 implies a new refutation certificate for programs: if the
martingale is finite and non-constant it actually refutes termination with prob-
ability 1, not just finite expected time to termination.
For example, if we consider the one-dimensional random walker §7.1 it has an
exact unbounded martingale, and therefore our rule shows that it terminates with
probability 1. The walker in §7.2 has an exact bounded martingale, and this we
can conclude does not terminate with probability 1. In both cases Chatterjee’s
Theorem 7 would deduce that neither have finite expected time to terminate.
10 Conclusion
Our overall aim is (has always been) to allow and promote rigorous reasoning
at the level of program source-code. In this paper we have proposed a new rule,
combining earlier ideas of our own with important innovations of others, and
have attempted to formulate it in a way that indeed is will turn out to be
suitable for source code.
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That is, we hope that as an extension of what’s here we will be able to
formulate these rules in the program logic pGCL, or similar; and if the techniques
are further extended subsequently, we would hope to do the same for those too.
Program logic also provides a rigorous setting not only for use of the rules
but also for their proof in the first place. Although we did not use program logic
here, for our proofs, we believe it would be possible e.g. in the style of [20].
Finally, we have left an intriguing open question: is there an elementary
variant for the two-dimensional random walk? Foster [9] shows that there is
such a variant, but he does not give it in closed form. We conjecture that lgg
suffices, but have only verified that experimentally. Will we ever be able to set
as a student exercise
Assuming the properties [ . . . ] of the function [. . . ], use probabilistic
assertions in the source code of the following program to prove that it
terminates with probability one for any initial integers X,Y:
x,y:= X,Y
while x6=0 ∧ y6=0 do
x,y:= x+1,y
⊕ x-1,y
⊕ x,y+1
⊕ x,y-1
end ,
where iterated ⊕ is shorthand for uniform choice (in this case 1/4 each).
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A — Sketch of Foster’s proof [9]
We use the notation and definitions from §9.3 to present Foster’s Theorem 2.
Recall that we have assumed that S0={s0}, i.e. that termination occurs in a
single state, and that we have adjusted (the assumed deterministic) T so that it
takes s0 to itself.
Write f
(t)
i for the probability that T started from si reaches s0 for the first
time in the t-th step and (as Foster does) write pij for T (i)(j), the probability
that T takes one step from si to sj ; more generally write p
(t)
ij for the probability
that T takes t steps to do that. Foster remarks just after (F9) that a simple
special case is where time-to-termination is bounded, but notes that such an
assumption excludes the symmetric random walk and moves immediately to the
more general case. 23
For the more general case we note first that for i>0 we have f
(t+1)
i =∑
j pijf
(t)
j . So if we were hopefully to proceed simply by setting V (s0)=0 and
V (si) =
∑
1≤t f
(t)
i for i>0, then in the latter case we would check the super-
martingale property (F1) by calculating∑
j pijV (sj)
=
∑
j pij
∑
1≤t f
(t)
j
=
∑
1≤t
∑
j pijf
(t)
j
=
∑
1≤t f
(t+1)
i “above and i>0”
≤ ∑1≤t f (t)i , “(actually equal unless f (1)i >0)”
= V (si) ,
so that V would in fact be an exact martingale in most of S∗. 24 But this looks
too good to be true, and indeed it is: in fact
∑
1≤t f
(t)
i = 1 by assumption, so this
is just the special case where V is 1 everywhere except at s0; and the martingale
property is exact everywhere, except at states one step away from s0. And this
trivial V does not satisfy progress. 25
Still, the above is the seed of a good idea. Using “a theorem of Dini” [17,
Foster’s citation (4)], 26 that
If cn is a sequence of positive terms with
∑
n cn <∞, then also∑
n
cn
(cn+cn+1 + · · · )α < ∞
when α<1,
23 [8] also treats the bounded-termination case explicitly.
24 Think of the symmetric random walk, where everywhere-1 is an exact martingale
except when |x|=1, where it is a proper super-martingale.
25 It is trivial in Blackwell’s sense [1], a constant solution.
26 There seems to be a typographical error here in Foster’s paper, where he writes∑∞
r=1 λ
(r)f
(r)
i instead of
∑∞
r=1 λ
(r)f
(r)
1 .
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Foster increases the f
(t)
i terms above by dividing them by
√
f
(t)
1 + f
(t+1)
1 + · · · ,
which is non-zero but no more than one, 27 and still (as we will see) the new,
larger terms still have a finite sum. (A minor detail is that he must show that
the sum f
(t)
1 +f
(t+1)
1 + · · · does not become zero at some large t and make terms
from then on infinite: his assumption (F7) prevents that by ensuring that from
no state in S∗ does a single T -step go entirely into S0.) With the revised V
replacing the earlier “hopeful” definition, the calculation above becomes instead∑
j pijV (sj)
=
∑
j≥1 pij
∑
1≤t f
(t)
j /
√
f
(t)
1 +f
(t+1)
1 +··· “revised definition of V ,
and V (s0)=0”
=
∑
1≤t
∑
j pij
f
(t)
j /
√
f
(t)
1 +f
(t+1)
1 +···
=
∑
1≤t f
(t+1)
j /
√
f
(t)
1 +f
(t+‘)
1 +···
=
∑
1≤t f
(t+1)
j /
√
f
(t+1)
1 +f
(t+2)
1 +··· “denominator is not increased”
≤ ∑1≤t f(t)j /√f(t)1 +f(t+1)1 +···
= V (si) .
This is encouraging: but we still must prove (F3) for our revised definition 28
V (si) =
∑
1≤t
f
(t)
i√
f
(t)
1 + f
(t+1)
1 + · · ·
, for i≥1 (6)
i.e. that it’s finite for all i and not only for the i=1 that Dini gave us; and we
must show that is satisfies (F2), i.e. that it tends to infinity as i does.
For the first, Foster proves that V (si)≤V (s1)/p(t
′)
1i for any i>1 and some
t′>0 with p(t
′)
1i >0, which is one place he uses (F7), in particular that every si is
accessible from s1.
Specifically, he reasons as follows:
(i) For that t′ and any t we have f (t
′+t)
1 ≥ p(t
′)
1i f
(t)
i , because we know that s1’s
journey to s0 can go via si.
(ii) The numerator f
(t)
i in (6) can therefore be replaced by f
(t′+t)
1 /p
(t′)
1i provided
(≤) replaces the equality.
(iii) The sum in the denominator of (6) can be adjusted to start at t′+t rather
than t, still preserving the inequality.
(iv) The overall sum in (6) of non-negative terms for V (si) is now the “drop the
first t′ terms suffix” of that same sum for V (s1), which we already know to
be finite (from Dini), but divided by p
(t′)
1i which we know to be non-zero.
For the second, Foster uses the δ from (F8), showing that V (si) is at least
(1−δ)/
√
f
(ti)
1 +f
(ti+1)
1 +··· where ti is the number of steps after which si reaches s0
27 It is the square-root of the probability that s1 does not reach s0 in fewer than t
steps.
28 Note the f ’s in the denominator are subscripted “1”, not “i”.
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with probability at least δ for the first time. By (F8) that ti tends to infinity as
i does, and thus so does V (si).
His detailed reasoning is as follows:
(i) Since ti’s tending to infinity is all that is required, any at-most-finite num-
ber of i’s where ti=0 can be ignored. Thus pick ti≥1.
(ii) Then V (si) is at least
∑
1+ti≤t f
(t)
i /
√
f
(t)
1 +f
(t+1)
1 +··· , a suffix of its defining
series (6).
(iii) Since the denominators only decrease, we can replace all of the denomina-
tors by
√
f
(ti)
1 + f
(ti+1)
1 + · · · while making the sum only smaller.
(iv) From (F8) however and the choice of ti we know that
∑
ti≤t f
(t)
0 is no
more than 1−δ. Thus similarly we can replace f (t)i by 1−δ and remove the
summation.
(v) We are left with V (si) ≥ (1−δ)/
√
f
(ti)
1 +f
(ti+1)
1 +··· , as appealed to above.
That completes the proof sketch.
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B Loop rule pre´cis (from §9.4)
To be clear, we interpret here our Lem. 7.3.1 from [20], which includes demonic
nondeterminism. The lemma reads
Let invariant I satisfy [G]∗I V wlp.body.I. Then I&T V wp.loop.([G]∗I),
where T is the termination probability wp.loop.[true] of the loop.
We note that
– G is a predicate over the variables of the program.
– Square brackets [·] convert Boolean true,false to numeric 1,0 respectively.
– I, T are real-valued expressions over the variables of the program, in the
interval [0, 1].
– wp and wlp are the probabilistic generalisations of Dijkstra’s weakest- and
weakest-liberal precondition functions respectively [6, 18, 25, 20].
– G is the loop guard, for us a predicate characterising S∗.
– I is the loop invariant, for us (confusingly) the variant V .
– V is the ≤ relation on functions, defined pointwise (as usual).
– [G]∗I V wlp.body.I says that the expected value of I (our V ) after one
transition is at least as great as its actual value at the state from which the
transition was taken. (The [G]∗ means that the relation is mandated only
when G holds, i.e. within S∗.) Thus it is this condition that states that V is
a sub-martingale on S∗.
– In general A&B is A + B − 1 max 0 when 0≤A,B≤1. Thus when T=1 we
have that I&T = I.
– G is G’s negation, so that [G]∗I is our V set to zero on S∗, equivalently our
V restricted to S0.
– The lemma’s inequality thus states
If termination occurs with probability one (T=1 everywhere), then
the value of V on the starting state is no more than (I&T V)
the expected value of V on S0 when escape from S∗ has occurred
(wp.loop.([G]∗I)).
34
